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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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The specific legatee of an automobile sought to collect the proceeds
of an insurance policy on the automobile after an accident in which it
was damaged. The testatrix sustained injuries in the accident which
resulted in her subsequent death. The insurance company paid to the
executor the value of the automobile after the accident and took pos-
session of it as salvage. The court held that the executor was entitled
to the proceeds of the policy and that the legatee was entitled only to
the value of the automobile as of the death of the testatrix. The in-
surance policy was held to be a personal contract between the testatrix
and the insurer, hence the legatee had no interest therein.1
The case clearly illustrates how the relationship of the death of a
testator and the damage or destruction of a specific legacy may produce
varied results. That is, since the rights of the legatee are ordinarily de-
termined as of the death of the testator,2 it will be important whether
the damage or destruction of the legacy or -devise occurred prior to
or subsequent to the testator's death.
In the first instance, i.e., where the damage.or destruction occurred
prior to the death, the law of ademption controls. 3 Without elaborating
on the intricacies of ademption, suffice it to say that ordinarily ademp-
tion is defined as the taking away of the subject matter of a specific
legacy 4 or devise by its destruction, or its disposition by the testator in
his lifetime. 5 Therefore, if the specific legacy or devise is damaged or
8 This would certainly seem to be the conclusion to be drawn from Branch
v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F. 2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) ; Nestle Food Co.,
Inc., 2 F. T. C. 171 (1919); Caravel Co., Inc., 6 F. T. C. 198 (1923); Robert
M. Lease Co., Inc., et al., 12 F. T. C. 85 (1928) ; Export Petroleum Co. of Calif.,
Ltd., 17 F. T. C. 119 (1932); Lake Erie Chemical Co., et al., 29 F. T. C. 67
(1939)
'It re Barry's Estate, 252 P. 2d 437 (Okla., 1952). Accord, Ind. Mutual
Cyclone Ins. Co. v. Rinard, 102 Ind. App. 546, 200 N. E. 452 (1936) ; Converse
v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 315 Mass. 544, 53 N. E. 2d 841 (1944) ;
In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937); III
AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952).2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-41 (1943 Recomp. 1950).
'In re Hilpert's Estate, 165 Misc. 430, 300 N. Y. Supp. 886 (Sur. 1937) ;III
AMERICAN LA W OF PROPERTY § 14.32 (1952) where it is stated: "The right
to recover on a fire insurance policy when the loss occurred in the lifetime of
decedent passes to his personal representatives, as in case of any other chose in
action; this recovery is for the general benefit of the estate and not for the
devisee or others entitled to the land."
'28 R. C. L. WILLS § 341 (1921).
'Green v. Green, 231 N. C. 707, 58 S. E. 2d 722 (1950) ; Tyner v. Meadows,
215 N. C. 733, 3 S. E. 2d 264 (1939) ; King v. Sellars, 194 N. C. 533, 140 S. E.
19531
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destroyed prior to the testator's death, the rules of ademption will op-
erate to extinguish or limit what the legatee takes under the will. It
logically follows also that in this instance the legatee will not be en-
titled to the proceeds of insurance on the specific legacy, since he has
sustained no loss.
Where the damage or destruction to the specific legacy occurs
after the death of the testator, there is, of course, no ademption, and
the insurance collected by the executor will be held in trust for the
legatee who has sustained the loss.6 In this situation, the legacy
existed in its normal condition at the time of the testator's death, hence
the legatee is entitled to its fair value at that time.
The most perplexing problems arise when the available facts indicate
that the death of the testator and the damage or destruction of the legacy
were apparently simultaneous. In one New York case, 7 the testatrix died
in the sinking of a ship and the specific legacy was lost in the same
sinking. The court, in awarding to the legatee certain proceeds to
cover the value of the chattel, briefly held that "there was no de-
struction, selling or disposition of the articles in question during the life-
time of the testatrix." An English case,8 decided on somewhat the
same facts, reached a result contrary to the New York case. The
testator and the specific legacy were lost at sea and the court held that
there was an ademption of the legacy, hence the insurance proceeds
belonged to the estate. The reasons given for the decisions in both
cases were brief and no basis for the contrary results can be determined
from either case. It is possible that the New York court could have
considered the fact that the property was insoluble and still in existence
at the time of the testarix' death, thus preventing ademption. If such
was the case, the court would probably have reached a contrary 'decision
if the specific legacy and the testator had perished in a conflagration re-
sulting in the complete destruction of the legacy. It is submitted that
the New York court arrived at the more equitable decision in the
matter. However, due to the varied circumstances that may surround
an apparently simultaneous death of the testator and destruction of the
legacy, the court would probably refuse to indulge in any presumptions
and the burden would fall on the legatee, in claiming the proceeds from
the legacy, to prove that there has been no ademption.9 On the other
91 (1927) ; Starbuck v. Starbuck, 93 N. C. 183 (1885) ; Taylor v. Bond, 45 N. C.
5 (1851); 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1513 et seq. (1941).' Culbertson v. Cox, 29 Minn. 309, 13 N. W. 177 (1882) ; Millard v. Beaumont,
194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S. W. 547 (1916); Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253
(1863) ; Graham v. Roberts, 43 N. C. 99 (1851) ; VANCE, INSURANCE § 133 (3d.
ed. 1951).
'In re Shymer's Estate, 136 Misc. 334, 242 N. Y. Supp. 234 (Sur. 1930).
'Durant v. Friend, 5 De G & S 343, 64 Eng. Rep. 1145 (1852).
'Note, 43 HARV. L. Rav. 1311 (1930).
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hand, the courts seem to favor the construction of a will which prevents
the failure of a bequest or legacy.' 0 Certainly that construction should
have some weight when there has been no intent or voluntary act on
the part of the testator to cause an ademption, as where the testator
and specific legacy perish simultaneously.
The testator by making a specific legacy intends a real benefit to the
legatee, and if the legacy is defeated through operation of law rather
than by his own act, his intent may be said to have been defeated. Even
if the legacy is defeated by his own act, there is no conclusive intent on
his part that the legacy be adeemed. Of course, this undesirable result
has been alleviated somewhat by the courts in construing the legacy
as a general or demonstrative legacy if at all possible." Even though
the legacy is clearly a specific one which has been destroyed, it would
seem that in some instances the legatee would be entitled to the pro-
ceeds therefrom on the basis of the testator's implied intention. That is,
if it can be implied from the "four corners" of the will that the testator
intended some fixed pattern of distribution among the natural subjects
of his bounty, there would appear to be no objection to allowing the
proceeds of adeemed property to be paid to a legatee or devisee.1
2
Hence, by construction, the apparent intent of the testator may be served
and ademption prevented.
Further, attempts have been made in some jurisdictions to remedy
the situation by statute. 13  Kentucky's statute' 4 seems to be the most
liberal of the statutes on the subject, but it operates to prevent ademp-
tion only where the heirs of the testator are concerned. In one case
decided under the statute,'5 it was held that a specific devise of a farm
to the testator's heirs was not adeemed by a sale of it during the tes-
tator's lifetime and the devisee-heirs were entitled to the proceeds. It
1 Willis v. Barrow, 218 Ala. 549, 119 So. 678 (1929) ; Palmer v. French, 326
Mo. 710, 32 S. W. 2d 591 (1930) ; In re Strasenburgh's Will, 136 Misc. 91, 242
N. Y. Supp. 453 (Sur. 1930) ; In re Levas Estate, 33 Wash. 2d 530, 206 P. 2d 482
(1949).
" Vogel v. Saunders, 92 F. 2d 984 (D. C. 1938) ; Conway v. Shea, 282 Mass.
25, 183 N. E. 771 (1933); Methodist Church v. Thomas, 235 Mo. App. 671, 145
S. W. 2d 157 (1941) ; In re Liell's Will, 139 Misc. 513, 247 N. Y. Supp. 386 (Sur.
1931) ; Smith v. Smith, 192 N. C. 687, 690, 135 S. E. 855, 857 (1927) ("If the
words will be satisfied by anything of the same kind, not owned by the testator,
the legacy is general.").
12 See Trust Co. v. Miller, 223 N. C. 1, 4, 25 S. E. 2d 177, 178 (1943) ; Nooe
v. Vannoy, 59 N. C. 185, 189 (1860).
"ALA. CODE ANN. § 61-15 (1940) (if the testator conveys his interest in the
devised property and later acquires a new interest, the new interest passes unless
it appears from the will or other instruments that the testator intended a revoca-
tion of the will) ; GA. CODE ANx. § 113-818 (1937) (no ademption if the testator
exchanges property devised for other of like character) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 394.360
(1948) (when property devised to an heir is thereafter converted, the devisee shall
receive the value of the devise unless a contrary intent appear from the will or
other evidence).
S"Ky. REv. STAT. § 394.360 (1948).
" Westover's Ex'rx v. Westover, 313 Ky. 545, 233 S. W. 2d 105 (1950).
1953]
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has been suggested that "anti-ademption statutes" could be passed, as
we now have "anti-lapse statutes," to prevent the legacy's failing;1
but apparently no state has been willing to go so far to remedy the
situation. Even if it were found under the above remedies that the
legatee or devisee were entitled to the proceeds of the legacy, query
as to whether insurance proceeds would be considered proceeds of the
legacy or of a separate contract.
It would seem that the most practical remedy is to be found in the
will itself. Thus, if the testator were to provide in his will that if the
specific legacy is not a part of his estate at his death, the legatee is to
take other rights, such as the proceeds of the property, the property
purchased with the proceeds of the property, or the insurance derived
from its damage or destruction in lieu of the property specifically be-
queathed, the problem would be practically extinct except for the matter
of tracing proceeds. The intent of the testator can best be served when
drafting his will by informing him of the possibility of ademption and
the remedies available.
ELTON C. PRIDGEN
Witnesses-Competency of Husband and Wife-Effect of Validity
and Purpose of Marriage
Defendant was on trial for violation of the immigration laws. He
had entered into a marriage in France with an honorably discharged
veteran for the purpose of bringing himself within the language of the
War Brides Act1 so as to gain entrance to the United States. At the
time of the marriage both parties understood its limited purpose; it was
agreed that a divorce would be obtained after the marriage had served
this purpose; and the wife received a sum of money for participating
in the plan. At the trial the government offered the wife as a witness
against the defendant. He objected on the ground that she was his wife
pursuant to a French marriage and therefore incompetent to testify
against him. Held: The validity or invalidity of the French marriage
is immaterial. The relationship was entered into with no intention of
the parties to live together as husband and wife, but only for the pur-
pose of using the ceremony in a scheme to defraud. The marriage was
a sham, empty, phony affair, and the ostensible spouse was competent
to testify against the defendant. 2
"0 Mecham, Why Not a Modern Wills Act?, 33 IowA L. REv. 501, 514 (1948):
1TI AmERIcAN LAW oF PROPERTY § 14.13 (1952).
'See 59 STAT. 659 (1945), 8 U. S. C § 232 (1947) which provides in effect
that alien spouses of United States citizens serving in, or having an honorable
discharge certificate from the armed forces of the United States during the
Second World War, shall be admitted to the United States.2 Lutwak v. U. S., 73 Sup. Ct. 481 (1953).
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